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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(4). The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by an 
Order dated February 26, 2002, R. at 111. Prior to the transfer, Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-2-2(3)0), conferred jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether Ms. Dowling's claim for alienation of affection, filed 4 years after she learned 
of Ms. Bullen's alleged fault and the harm arising therefrom, is barred by the 2-year statute of 
limitation in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (§78-14-4(1)) where the claim arises out of 
and relates to the therapy rendered by Ms. Bullen, a licensed clinical social worker. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is before the Court on Ms. Dowling's appeal of Judge Peuler's grant of 
Summary Judgment. This Court must construe the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. 
Dowling. Tucker v. State Farm, 2002 UT 54,1J2, 449 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (S. Ct. 6/11/02). 
Determining which statute of limitation applies, and interpreting that statute, are 
questions of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Id. at [^5. See Order Granting 
Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 93-96, and Plaintiffs Notice of 
Appeal, R. at 97-98. 
Plaintiffs purported motion to amend her complaint to add a claim for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was not briefed, noticed for submission, or 
ruled upon by Judge Peuler. Accordingly, neither the motion to amend nor the cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is at issue on appeal. Plaintiffs 
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Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 60, ^ 2 of Summary of 
Argument; Order Granting Summary Judgment, R. at 93-96. 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
The following sections of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-1, et seq., 
control the outcome of this case. They are set forth in full in the Addendum: 
Section 78-14-3(11) 
Section 78-14-3(14) 
Section 78-14-4(1) 
Section 78-14-8 
Rules: 
Rule 4-501(2)(B), Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
In late 1994, Ms. Dowling and her (then) husband, James Anthony Hoagland, 
were having serious marital problems. Not surprisingly, their two daughters were 
experiencing difficulties related to those domestic problems. Accordingly, Ms. Dowling 
and James enrolled their daughters in therapy with Kathleen Bullen, a licensed clinical 
social worker, in December 1994. Ms. Bullen was not acquainted with any of the family 
members prior to this time. Approximately one year later, in mid-January 1996, James 
filed for divorce from Ms. Dowling; the divorce became final on September 26, 1996. 
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Ms. Dowling blames her divorce on Kathleen Bullen. She alleges that Kathleen 
seduced her husband and inspired him to file the divorce papers in January 1996. She did 
not become aware of Kathleen's role until the day the divorce became final, however. 
She filed her lawsuit exactly four years later, on September 25, 2000. 
Although Ms. Bullen's role in James's decision to divorce is hotly contested on 
the merits, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment Kathleen assumed the truth 
of Ms. Dowling's allegations and proceeded on the basis that the statute of limitations 
expired long before the complaint was filed. In her moving papers Ms. Bullen set forth 
the facts essentially as pled by Ms. Dowling. In opposing the motion, Ms. Dowling did 
not controvert so much as one factual allegation, including the allegation that both 
plaintiff and her then husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen. See 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, R. at 37, If 5. See also, Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, R. at 59-60, ^ 8, 12 -
15, 18, and Order Granting Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment, R. at 94, f A.5. The Statement of Facts set forth in Ms. Dowling's brief on 
appeal is likewise instructive. 
At the oral argument on the motion for summary judgment Ms. Dowling argued, 
for the first time, that because Kathleen Bullen had denied a therapeutic relationship with 
Suzanne Dowling in her Answer to the Complaint, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
did not apply. See Transcript of Hearing, R. at 115, pp. 17:1 - 20:12. Judge Peuler 
examined the complaint, the undisputed facts set forth in Ms. Bullen's supporting 
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memorandum, the virtually identical statement of facts set forth in Ms. Dowling's 
opposing memorandum, including the complete absence of any controverting facts, and 
concluded that Ms. Dowling had indeed alleged that her whole family, including herself, 
were in a patient/therapist relationship and that the alienation of affection occurred 
precisely because Ms. Bullen violated the standard of care applicable to that relationship. 
Consequently, the claim for alienation of affection was related to and arose out of the 
health care provided by Kathleen Bullen and was barred as untimely. Minute Entry, R. at 
85-87 (also included in the Addendum to Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal). See also, Order 
Granting Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 95, ^ B (included in 
the Addendum to this Brief of Appeal). 
On September 10, 2001, as a part of her response to Ms. Bullen's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Ms. Dowling purported to file a motion to amend her complaint to 
add a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. This "motion" is, 
in reality, merely a part of the Summary of Argument. There was no separate motion 
filed. The issue was not briefed. Ms. Dowling provided no explanation of the grounds 
for the motion nor for the lateness in filing the motion. Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary of Argument, R. at 60, ^ 2. 
Plaintiff filed a proposed Amended Complaint in connection with her opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. R. at 44 - 52. 
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Statement of Facts 
The following facts, taken verbatim from the Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 37-38, were undisputed in the 
trial court: 
1. Suzanne Dowling was married to James Hoagland and they 
had two daughters. Complaint at Tf 12. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, defendant Bullen was a licensed 
clinical social worker. Complaint at ^ f 9. 
3. In December 1994, Ms. Bullen began treating the daughters of 
plaintiff and her then husband, James Hoagland. Complaint at ^ f 15; Affidavit 
of Kathleen Bullen Hoagland. 
4. From time to time, plaintiff and her then husband sat in on 
therapy sessions with their daughters. Complaint at 1fl{ 16 and 17. 
5. Plaintiff alleges that both she and her then husband were in 
individual therapy with Ms. Bullen, an allegation which Ms. Bullen denies. 
Complaint at Iff 13-19. However, for purposes of this Motion for Summary 
Judgment only, Ms. Bullen does not dispute this allegation. 
6. Plaintiff and her then husband were unable to resolve their 
marital difficulties and James Hoagland filed for divorce in January 1996. 
Complaint at f^ 18. The divorce became final on or about September 26, 
1996. Complaint at Tj 20. 
7. Plaintiff alleges that at "about this same time", that is, 
September 26, 1996, she learned that Ms. Bullen had engaged in an improper 
relationship with her now ex-husband when her ex-husband and defendant 
Bullen announced that they were dating each other. Complaint at ^ 21. Ms. 
Bullen believes that her friendship with James Hoagland became known in 
July 1996 but, for purposes of this motion only, she does not dispute 
plaintiffs allegation as to the date Plaintiff learned of it. 
8. Any therapeutic relationship between Ms. Bullen and plaintiff 
ended in February 1996. Complaint at Tf 19. 
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9. Ms. Bullen terminated her therapeutic relationship with the 
children of Suzanne Dowling and James Hoagland in the Spring of 1996 
(early June for one daughter and mid-April for the other). Affidavit of 
Kathleen Bullen-Hoagland. 
10. Defendant Bullen had no further therapy sessions with any 
member of plaintiffs family or with plaintiffs ex-husband after she 
terminated therapy sessions with plaintiffs daughters. Complaint at ^ 16. All 
therapeutic contact with plaintiff and plaintiffs family had ended by early 
June 1996. Id. 
11. Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until September 25, 2000, 
more than four years and 3 months after the acts of negligence of which 
Plaintiff now complains. See Complaint. 
12. At no time prior to filing her Complaint did plaintiff serve 
defendant Bullen with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action or with a 
Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review. Affidavit of Kathleen Bullen-
Hoagland. 
See also, Order Granting Defendant Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Judgment, R. at 94-95; Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Statement of Facts, R. at 58-60; and Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal, Statement of 
Facts, pp. 4 - 5 . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The thrust of plaintiff s argument on appeal seems to be that she was not Kathleen 
Bullen's patient and, therefore, the two-year statute of limitation in the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1), does not bar her lawsuit. This 
argument fails for two reasons. First, it was undisputed in the trial court that Ms. 
Dowling was in therapy with Kathleen Bullen. Second, the Health Care Malpractice Act 
governs claims "relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have 
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been rendered by the health care provider." Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-3(14). It is 
not limited to claims for treatment of the patient by the provider. 
The allegations of the complaint, the oral argument at the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment, and the statement of facts and arguments set forth in Ms. 
Dowling's brief on appeal, all attest that this case is based upon the actions of Kathleen 
Bullen allegedly acting in violation of her role as a social worker for the family of 
Suzanne Dowling. As Ms. Dowling says in her Statement of the Case, "Plaintiff and her 
spouse (James) would attend the meetings in order to check on the progress of their 
children. Defendant began to develop feelings for James to such a degree that she 
initiated an intimate relationship with him prior to the filing of the divorce between 
Plaintiff and James." Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 3. Thus, Plaintiffs claim relates to 
and arises out of the health care rendered by Kathleen Bullen and is governed by the 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides a uniform statute of limitations 
for all claims against health care providers that relate to or arise out of the provision of 
health care. Some statutes of limitation are lengthened by the Act and some are 
shortened. Both the legislature and the Supreme Court have concluded that one statute 
should apply whether the claim sounds "in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise." Utah Code Annotated §78-14-3(14). See, Jensen v. IHC, 944 P.2d 
214 (Utah 1997). There is no exception for intentional torts. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MS. DOWLING HAD A THERAPEUTIC 
RELATIONSHIP WITH KATHLEEN BULLEN. 
A. The Facts Upon Which the Trial Court Relied Were Uncontroverted. 
Plaintiffs efforts to create an issue of fact on appeal are misplaced. The statement 
of facts upon which Ms. Bullen relied for her motion is quoted verbatim above. The 
statement of facts submitted by Ms. Dowling in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment is nearly identical to Ms. Bullen's statement and included the following 
allegations: 
8. Kathleen Bullen was a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, 
engaged in interviewing, counseling, and/or providing professional therapy 
with respect to people's problems, and specifically with respect to Dowling 
and Dowling's family member's problems, 
9. Dowling, acting upon Bullen's representation, reasonably 
believed that Bullen was a therapist and/or professional counselor. 
10. Bullen practiced with and, on information and belief was 
employed by, Canyon Rim and Trolley Corners. 
11. Dowling was married to James Anthony Hoagland, Jr., 
(hereinafter "James"), and they resided in their marital home in Salt Lake 
City, Utah with their two (2) children prior to their divorce on September 
26, 1996. 
12. In late 1994, Dowling's family members began counseling 
sessions with Bullen in order to work through personal problems. 
13. Dowling, along with her family, attended numerous 
counseling sessions with Bullen. 
14. In December, 1994, Dowling's two daughters began 
counseling with Bullen. 
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15. In December 1995, Dowling, along with her two daughters 
and James began family counseling with Bullen. As a result of Bullen's 
position as a counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of trust in the 
eyes of the plaintiff. The family or various members of the family attended 
counseling with Bullen until approximately June of 1996. 
18. In February 1996, one month after James filed for divorce, 
Bullen suggested to Dowling that Dowling seek another counselor, namely 
Susan Culbertson. 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 59-60 
(emphasis added). See also, Affidavit of Suzanne Dowling, R. at 53-55.x Plaintiff set 
forth substantially the same allegations in the Statement of Facts, pp. 4 - 5 of her Brief 
on Appeal, although she altered them in a few particulars to de-emphasize her and 
James's status as patients. Compare Tflj 8, 12, 13, and 15 of the Statement of Facts in 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with f^ j 1, 5 and 6 of 
the Statement of Facts in Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal. 
As Judge Peuler observed, the parties agree that Ms. Dowling and her family were 
therapy patients of Kathleen. Without question, Ms. Dowling's claim against Kathleen is 
based upon the fact that Kathleen was the therapist and that she violated her therapeutic 
duties. It is undisputed that Kathleen became acquainted with James Hoagland and 
!If Ms. Dowling had intended to controvert Ms. Bullen's statement of facts in the trial 
court, her affidavit would have been the most logical place to do so. However, instead of 
claiming that she and her husband were not patients of Ms. Bullen, she variously averred: 
"We initiated therapy with Kathleen Bullen for a number of reasons . . ."; "I was 
devastated to discover that the individual retained to help our family . . ."; "I had always 
believed that with counseling I could work out our family and marital problems. . .." 
Affidavit of Suzanne Dowling, R. at 53 - 54, fflf 2, 6 and 7. 
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Suzanne Dowling through the therapy sessions. Affidavit of Kathleen Bullen, R. at 31, 
Tf3. To the extent Kathleen "developed feelings" for James prior to January 1996 (the 
date of the divorce petition) it was solely in the context of the therapy sessions. 
B. The Uncontroverted Facts Dictate the Outcome of this Appeal. 
Rule 4-501(2)(B), Utah Code of Judicial Administration (April 2001), provides, in 
pertinent part: 
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement. 
Where Ms. Dowling did not controvert any of the facts set forth by Kathleen Bullen, 
Judge Peuler was bound to apply the lawr to the facts as set forth by Ms. Bullen. Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Ms. Dowling did not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The only facts she set forth corroborated the facts relied upon by Kathleen Bullen. Judge 
Peuler was well within her prerogative by ruling, as she did, "that the record indicates 
that [a therapist/patient] relationship existed." Minute Entry, R. at 86 (also contained in 
the Addendum to Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal). 
Ms. Dowling's assertions at the oral argument on the motion are insufficient to 
meet her burden of establishing the existence of a genuine factual dispute. The assertions 
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of counsel are not evidence. Significantly, Ms. Dowling did not make a proffer of 
evidence at the oral argument. Her affidavit confirmed the therapeutic relationship. 
Supra, note 1. There was nothing in the record upon which Judge Peuler could have 
relied to support a ruling for Ms. Dowling. See Transcript of Hearing, R. at 115 (also 
included in the Addendum to Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal). As Judge Peuler aptly 
observed during the presentation of Ms. Dowling's side of the oral argument, "Well, and 
understand, if you will, the only thing—the only record that I have at this point is what's 
contained in the file." Transcript of Hearing, R. at 115, p. 17:21 - 23. Judge Peuler 
cannot be expected to rule upon assertions Ms. Dowling now wishes she had put into the 
record. 
C. Summary Judgment Tests the Complaint Not the Answer. 
Ms. Dowling's appeal seems to be based upon her belief that the Defendant's 
Answer can serve as the basis for defeating summary judgment. This may be true in a 
case where the defendant does not assume as true the allegations of the complaint in 
seeking the ruling. However, where, as here, the defendant assumes the truthfulness of 
the allegations of the complaint there is nothing to dispute. The Answer is totally 
irrelevant to resolving the summary judgment. Parenthetically, Ms. Dowling's attempt to 
rely upon the Answer is a tacit admission that the allegations of her complaint are not 
true. If the allegations of the complaint are not true, she has no basis for a recovery in 
any event. 
Another way to analyze Ms. Dowling's misguided appeal is to assume that she 
intended somehow to allege only that Kathleen Bullen, acting in a personal rather than 
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professional capacity, is guilty of alienating James's affections, not that Ms. Bullen 
abused her role as a therapist to the family. In other words, maybe Ms. Dowling now 
wants to abandon the assertions in her complaint and pursue a very different theory than 
the one she pled. 
If Ms. Dowling really believed that Kathleen Bullen's role as a therapist for the 
family played no part in the alienation of James's affection, she should have moved to 
amend her pleadings before the motion for summary judgment was filed. She had nearly 
a year from the date she filed her complaint before Kathleen Bullen brought the motion 
for summary judgment. Significantly, she knew from the outset of the case that Ms. 
Bullen intended to file a motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of 
limitations. Transcript of Hearing, R. at 115, pp. 15:22 - 16:6. Obviously, it is too late 
to amend the complaint as a means of defeating a motion for summary judgment. 
Holmes Development, LLC, v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, TJ59, 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 27 (S. 
Ct., April 16, 2002) ("By relegating its motion to the end of the memoranda opposing the 
motions to dismiss, Holmes's motion did not comply with Utah's formal motion practice 
rules. [Internal citations omitted.] Simply put, Holmes's abbreviated requests for leave 
to amend its complaint 'lacking . . . statements] of the grounds for amendment and 
dangling at the end of [its] memorand[a, do] not rise to the level of a motion for leave to 
amend.'"). See also First City Bank v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127 
(10th Cir. 1987) (where the plaintiffs had completed discovery and the defendants then 
filed a motion to amend their answer, the court was within its discretion to deny the 
motion, even without showing of prejudice); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 
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459, 470 (5th Cir. 1967) (The value of summary judgment would be destroyed "if a party 
were free to rely on one theory in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary judgment 
and then, should that theory prove unsound, come back long thereafter and fight on the 
basis of some other theory."); Local 472 v. Georgia Power Co, 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 
1982) (after discovery was complete and all defendants had filed motions for summary 
judgment, an attempt to amend was nothing more than an effort to avoid adverse 
summary judgment). 
However, even if Ms. Dowling's tardy amendment was allowed it does not change 
the character of Ms. Dowling's original complaint. She merely sought to add a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the same alleged violation of 
Kathleen's duties as therapist. She did not allege there, as she attempts to do here, that 
Kathleen Bullen had taken a shine to James in her private capacity. She aggressively 
alleged that Kathleen abused her position as the family's therapist in seducing James and 
alienating his affections. See Proposed Amended Complaint, R. at 44 - 51, especially Tflj 
23 - 45. See also, Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal at 16-17. 
II. DOWLING'S CLAIM IS RELATED TO AND ARISES FROM 
THE THERAPY PROVIDED BY KATHLEEN BULLEN. 
Section 78-14-3 provides in relevant part: 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provider. 
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Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-3(14) (1996). There can be little doubt that Ms. 
Dowling's complaint against Kathleen Bullen seeks recovery for personal injuries 
"relating to or arising out of health care rendered'' by Ms. Bullen. 
In paragraphs 9 through 22 of the Complaint, Ms. Dowling makes it clear that she 
is suing Kathleen because Kathleen is a licensed clinical social worker who undertook to 
provide services to Ms. Dowling's children and husband, as well as herself. "As a result 
of Bullen's position as a counselor, Bullen occupied a special position of trust in the eyes 
of Plaintiff." Complaint, R. at 3, Tj 16. See also, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, «[| 6, in 
her brief on appeal. The essence of Ms. Dowling's complaint is that she and her family 
went to Kathleen Bullen for help in dealing with life's challenges, including marital 
problems, and that Ms. Bullen, instead of helping them resolve their problems, seduced 
her husband by using her position as a trusted therapist. This exacerbated what was 
already a dysfunctional family, leading directly to James's decision to divorce Suzanne 
and marry Kathleen. 
In paragraphs 31 through 38, Ms. Dowling alleges that Kathleen breached her 
(Ms. Dowling's) therapist/patient privilege by sharing confidences gained in therapy with 
Kathleen's colleagues and with James, all without Ms. Dowling's consent. Breach of the 
therapist/patient privilege, by definition, arises out of and relates to health care rendered 
or which should have been rendered by Kathleen. 
Similar allegations are set forth in paragraphs 39 through 45 of the Complaint. 
Here, Ms. Dowling alleges that she had a contractual relationship for therapy services 
with Ms. Bullen. She alleges that Ms. Bullen was obligated by the terms of the contract 
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to provide counseling services that would be "in the best interest of Plaintiff." 
Complaint, R. at 6, f^ 42. Clearly, a claim for breach of this duty relates to and arises out 
of the therapy relationship. 
Paragraphs 46 through 50 set forth a claim for breach of the fiduciary relationship 
between Ms. Dowling and Kathleen Bullen. She alleges that 'Defendant Bullen 
breached this trust by divulging Plaintiffs confidences to Bullen's colleagues and 
Defendant's husband and by using said confidences to her own advantage in destroying 
plaintiffs marriage and entering into a relationship with Plaintiffs husband." 
Complaint, R. at 7, f^ 48. These allegations unquestionably relate to and arise out of the 
provision of therapeutic services by Kathleen Bullen and are governed by the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
At oral argument Ms. Dowling conceded that all of these claims were barred by 
the statute of limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Transcript of Hearing, 
R. at 115, p. 16:20-25. Consequently, she chose to focus her energies in opposing the 
motion and in perfecting this appeal on her fifth cause of action, the claim for alienation 
of affection. This claim is set out in paragraphs 51 through 58 of the Complaint, R. at 7-
8. 
In paragraph 51 Ms. Dowling "incorporate^] paragraphs 1 through 53 [sic] herein 
by reference." Complaint, R. at 7, ^J51. Thus, she made sure that her claim for alienation 
of affection was related to and arose out of the therapy relationship to the same extent as 
the other causes of action. Ms. Dowling went on to allege: 
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52. At the time Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family commenced 
counseling with Bullen at Defendant, Canyon Rim, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
husband were working through and resolving any difficulties they may 
have been experiencing. 
53. Defendant Bullen, by her actions in divulging Plaintiffs 
confidences, used her position of trust and influence as a licensed clinical 
social worker and family counselor, to poison Plaintiff's husband against 
Plaintiff 
54. Defendant further used her position to convince Plaintiffs 
husband to enter into a sexual relationship with Defendant and to conceal 
same from Plaintiff. 
Complaint, R. at 7-8, TflJ 52 - 54 (emphasis added). 
The only way that Ms. Dowling could have made it clearer that her allegations 
against Kathleen Bullen relate to or arise out of the health care she rendered or should 
have rendered would have been to quote the language of the statute in her complaint. 
The torts of which Plaintiff complains relate to or arise out of the therapy; they are 
governed by the 2-year statute of limitations.2 
The Utah courts have not had occasion specifically to construe the "relating to or 
arising out o f language found in the Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§78-14-3(14). However, the courts have broadly construed somewhat similar language 
Ms. Dowling's theory of liability is generally referred to as mishandling the 
transference/countertransference phenomenon, although it is sometimes framed in terms 
of the alienation of affection. See, e.g., Roe v. Federal Insurance Co., All Mass. 43, 587 
N.E.2d 214 (1992), cited by plaintiff, and Sunsinger v. Perez, 16 S.W. 3d 496 (Tex. App. 
Beaumont, 2000). Either way, the essence of the claim is that the patient developed 
feelings for the therapist, and the therapist inappropriately developed feelings for the 
patient, or a family member of the patient, and acted out those feelings rather than 
controlling them. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
(1995), "Countertransference" and "Transference", pp. 192 and 845, respectively. See 
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from the Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Annotated, §32A-2-401. For example, 
in Buczynski v. Industrial Commission of Utah this Court said that 
[a]n accident arises out of employment when there is a causal relationship 
between the injury and the employment. Arising out of, however, does not 
mean that the accident must be caused by the employment; rather, the 
employment is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises 
than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion. 
934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Obviously, the therapy provided by Ms. 
Bullen was the condition out of which the alleged alienation of affection arose. 
Moreover, there is a direct causal relationship between the therapy and the alleged tort 
because it was only through the therapy that Ms. Bullen became acquainted with Ms. 
Dowling and James, and it was only through the therapy that Ms. Bullen "developed 
feelings" for James. Here it can plainly be said that the therapy caused the alienation of 
affection. 
In the case of Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT APP 35, 996 P.2d 
1072 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court held that an employee injured while salting his 
driveway at home came within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act because 
he was preparing the driveway for a work-related delivery. The "injury arose in the 
course of his employment because his efforts to make his driveway safe for the delivery 
of work-related materials was 'reasonably incidental' to his work for Ae Clevite." 2000 
UT APP 35, If 10; 996 P.2d at 1075. Under this construction of the phrase "arising out 
o f there can be little doubt that the alleged alienation of affection complained of by Ms. 
also, DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28™ ED. 1994), 
"Countertransference" and "Transference", pp. 387 and 1732, respectively. 
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Dowling is directly related to and arises out of the therapy provided by Kathleen Bullen. 
All of Ms. Bullen's dealings with the plaintiff and her family were in the context of 
therapy, whether Ms. Dowling is considered Kathleen's patient or not. Her work with 
the family, including her meetings with Ms. Dowling and James, were for the purpose of 
furthering the therapeutic progress of family members. Significantly, the alleged 
alienation of affection did not occur just while Ms. Bullen was preparing for therapy but, 
according to Ms. Dowling's Complaint, right while therapy was going on. See also, 
National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 
577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) ("As used in a liability insurance policy, the words 
'arising out of are very broad, general and comprehensive. They are commonly 
understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and require only 
that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage 
is provided."). 
While neither the Worker's Compensation Act nor the liability insurance contract 
are perfect analogies to the Health Care Malpractice Act, both illustrate the inclination 
and the wisdom of the courts to construe the "relating to or arising out o f language 
broadly. A broad construction of this language allows for the uniform application of the 
statute of limitations to all health care providers and thus fulfills the stated purpose of the 
Act of making health care more affordable and available to the public. Utah Code 
Annotated §78-14-2. 
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III. THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT PROVIDES A UNIFORM 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR 
ALL TORTS RELATING TO OR ARISING OUT OF HEALTH CARE. 
Ms. Dowling tries to avoid the effect of the statute by arguing, first, that the Act 
does not apply to intentional torts and, second, that one need not be a health care provider 
in order to alienate the affections of another woman's husband. We address these 
arguments in reverse order. 
A. The Alienation (Allegedly) Occurred in the Context of Rendering Health Care. 
Ms. Bullen takes no issue with the argument that a non-therapist can alienate the 
affections of another woman's husband. Further, Ms. Bullen agrees that one can alienate 
a man's affections even if she does not know the man's wife. If Kathleen Bullen were 
not a licensed clinical social worker, and if the alleged alienation of affection had not 
occurred in the context of therapy, Ms. Dowling would have a stronger argument that her 
complaint was timely filed. 
Virtually every tort known to man can be committed either by a non-health care 
provider or by a health care provider. However, if a health care provider commits the tort 
in the context of rendering health care it is governed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. If the health care provider commits the tort while engaged in some conduct other 
than rendering health care, it is not covered by the Act. Thus, Ms. Dowling's example of 
the therapist dropping a book on the toe of a fellow church-goer is incomplete. If the 
therapist were to drop a book on the toe of a client in the context of providing therapy it 
would be covered by the Act. If the therapist were to drop a book on the toe of someone 
at church, or in a context other than one related to or arising out of therapy, it would not 
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be covered by the Act. If a therapist alienates her neighbor's husband's affection in a 
context other than treatment, it is not governed by the Health Care Malpractice Act. On 
the other hand, if that same therapist alienates that same neighbor's husband's affections 
in the context of treatment, it is governed by the Act. 
In this case, the alleged alienation of affection occurred in the context of therapy. 
This Court cannot lightly ignore the uncontroverted record before the trial court that 
Kathleen Bullen was a therapist providing health care services to Ms. Dowling and Ms. 
Dowling's husband and children when she allegedly alienated James's affections. She 
had no contact with James except in her role as the family's therapist. All of her contacts 
with James were inextricably intertwined with her work as the family's therapist. To the 
extent there is any truth to Ms. Dowling's allegations that Kathleen seduced James, all of 
the elements of the tort occurred in the context of the therapy relationship. Accordingly, 
the tort is governed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, including the 2-year statute 
of limitations. 
B. The Health Care Malpractice Act Governs Intentional Torts. 
Ms. Dowling's reliance upon Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992), 
undercuts her argument that the Act does not apply to intentional torts. First, that case 
indirectly affirms the applicability of the Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of 
limitations to intentional torts committed in the context of health care. Second, the Court 
applied various other sections of the Health Care Malpractice Act to the facts of the 
Lounsbury case to reverse the trial court's ruling in favor of Dr. Capel, further 
demonstrating that intentional torts are governed by the Act. 
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Lounsbury injured his back on the job. After his treating physician recommended 
surgery following the failure of more conservative treatment, Lounsbury sought a second 
opinion. Dr. Capel also opined that surgery was appropriate. However, Lounsbury 
refused to consent to surgery until further tests, including a myelogram, were performed 
and the results reviewed with him. While Lounsbury was recovering from the anesthesia 
administered in connection with the myelogram, Dr. Capel arranged for Mrs. Lounsbury 
to consent to the surgery on his behalf. Accordingly, when Lounsbury regained 
consciousness from what he thought was the diagnostic procedure, the surgery had 
already been performed. Lounsbury filed suit approximately two years later alleging that 
Dr. Capel committed battery, an intentional tort, by performing surgery without his 
consent. 
Normally, a claim for battery is barred after one year. Utah Code Annotated, §78-
12-29 (1996), provides that "[a]n action may be brought within one year: . . . (4) for libel, 
slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction . . .." However, the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act provides that a claim may be brought within two years after 
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury. The fact that neither the 
parties nor the court made an issue of the otherwise late filing of the complaint suggests 
that each recognized the applicability of the two-year statute of limitations in the Act to 
intentional torts committed within the context of rendering health care. 
The specific issue in Lounsbury, whether failure to obtain consent is the same as 
failure to obtain informed consent, was analyzed within the context of the Health Care 
Malpractice Act. The Court ultimately concluded that §78-14-5(1), the provision of the 
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Act governing informed consent, did not bar a claim where the doctor altogether failed to 
obtain any consent; it bars claims only where the doctor failed to obtain informed 
consent. (Most of the case discusses the substantive differences between "no consent" 
and "lack of informed consent.") 
The Court then construed §78-14-5(2)(e), which allows a doctor to proceed with 
treatment if s/he obtains consent from the patient's spouse, in light of §78-14-5(3), which 
gives an adult patient the unqualified right to refuse consent for personal or religious 
reasons. At no point did the Court even hint that the Act does not apply because the 
underlying tort was intentional in character. Instead, the Court gave meaning to specific 
provisions of the Act as they applied to the facts of the case. Certain limitations in the 
Act were held inapplicable and certain provisions were held to have greater applicability 
than others. 
The point is that this Court has already recognized the Act's applicability to an 
intentional tort relating to or arising out of the rendering of health care. If the Act applies 
to battery it applies to the alienation of affection so long as the alienation occurs within 
the context of rendering health care.3 
C. The Analogy to Malpractice Coverage is Inapt. 
Ms. Dowling's argument for a reversal bogs down in the confusion of coverage 
disputes between a therapist and her insurance carrier on the one hand, and malpractice 
3
 It is worth noting that the Act contains a specific provision extending the statute of 
limitations for the intentional tort of fraudulently concealing the alleged misconduct, 
suggesting again that the Act governs all malpractice, not just injuries inflicted through 
negligence. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §78-14-4(l)(b). 
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disputes between the patient and the therapist on the other. She seems to argue that if an 
insurer is not obligated to provide coverage for tortious behavior under the terms of an 
insuring agreement, then the Health Care Malpractice Act does not govern that tortious 
behavior either. This confusion likely arises from the practice of most insurance carriers 
of specifically excluding intentional torts from coverage under the policy. 
The case plaintiff relies upon, Roe v. Federal Insurance Co., 412 Mass. 43, 587 
N.E.2d 214 (1992) actually supports Ms. Bullen's argument. There the court recognized 
that determining whether the insurance policy provided coverage was a different inquiry 
from whether the dentist committed malpractice. 
In that case, the plaintiffs dentist engaged in overt sexual misconduct during 
dental treatment. The plaintiff filed a complaint against him with the Board of 
Registration, the Massachusetts equivalent of Utah's Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. The Board concluded that the dentist was guilty of gross 
misconduct in the practice of dentistry. The plaintiff then argued that this finding was 
controlling in her claim for insurance coverage. (She had settled her civil suit against the 
dentist in light of the disciplinary finding and the dentist assigned his rights in his 
malpractice policy to pay the agreed sum.) The court rejected this argument: 
Further, the question of what action, if any, a disciplinary board 
takes against a medical professional in response to complaints from 
patients is separate from the legal question whether given misconduct 
toward one patient is covered by that professional's malpractice insurance 
policy. The latter is a question of interpretation of the governing insurance 
policy. Thus, even assuming that the board's finding that the dentist was 
guilty of gross misconduct was relevant and admissible evidence, it is not 
dispositive of the issue whether his conduct fell within the coverage of the 
insurance policy. 
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412 Mass. at 46, 587 N.E.2d at 216, n. 4. 
Ms. Dowling argues that the alienation of affection is not a professional act or 
service because anyone, not just a licensed clinical social worker, can do it. Some courts 
have agreed with this position. See the cases cited in Sunsinger v. Perez, supra, at note 2, 
and the cases collected in Roe v. Federal Insurance Company above. However, these 
same courts largely agree that when the alienation of affection occurs, as it allegedly did 
here, within the context of a therapeutic relationship rather than a pediatrician/child, 
dentist/patient, or other non-therapist/patient relationship, it does relate to and arise out of 
the performance of a professional act or service. Thus, this argument provides little 
comfort for plaintiff under the facts she has alleged. 
D. The More Specific Statute of Limitations Governs Over the General. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act imposes some limitations on recovery that 
do not apply in the non-health care context. The Act imposes some procedures that are 
not generally applicable in the non-health care world of torts and breaches of contract. 
The Act changes the otherwise generally applicable statutes of limitation, as well. Some 
statutes are increased, such as the one-year statute for intentional torts like assault and 
battery, §78-12-29(4), and other statutes are decreased, such as the four-year "catch-all" 
statute that applies to garden variety negligence claims and to claims for alienation of 
affection, §78-12-25(3). 
The statute of limitation in the Health Care Malpractice Act also includes a 
"discovery rule" that is not generally applicable to most other torts, tolling the 
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commencement of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or should know of 
both the breach of duty and the injury caused by that breach of duty. In essence, the Act 
makes all statutes of limitation uniform as they apply to health care providers. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this specific issue in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), where it wrestled with whether the wrongful death or the 
medical malpractice statute of limitation should govern a claim for the death of a young 
mother who was fatally injured while being treated for complications arising from a 
caesarian delivery. 
Following the caesarian delivery of her second child, the young mother was 
transferred from the McKay-Dee Hospital to the University of Utah Medical Center for 
further treatment. While undergoing further treatment at the Medical Center, she 
suffered an anoxic brain injury, leaving her comatose and totally and permanently 
disabled for the next three and a half years, when she died. The family filed suit against 
McKay-Dee Hospital about three years after the caesarian section and against the 
University Medical Center about 3 months after the mother's death. The trial court 
rejected both claims as untimely. 
On appeal the family argued that a claim for wrongful death cannot arise until 
after the patient has died and that the law suit was brought well within the two-year 
statute of limitations for wrongful death. The Supreme Court held that the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations governed this case, not the wrongful death statute, and 
that it began to run when the family learned that the young mother's comatose and 
disabled condition was due to that malpractice: 
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When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the same 
subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which applies. In 
doing this, we follow the general rules of statutory construction, which 
provide both that "the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain 
language of the statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 
(Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that "'a more specific statute governs instead of 
a more general statute.'" De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 
743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted)). In this case, the Medical Malpractice 
Act's plain language indicates a legislative intent to have the statute apply 
to claims such as the ones Shelly's family seeks to bring. 
944P.2dat331. 
The family then argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the 
doctors and the hospitals committed fraud by concealing the malpractice leading to the 
young mother's death. The family invoked the general three-year statute of limitations 
applicable to fraud actions, §78-12-26(3), but the Court held that the two-year provision 
in the Health Care Malpractice Act dealing with fraudulent concealment, §78-14-4(l)(b), 
governed: 
The medical malpractice statute of limitations, with its discovery rule and 
that rule's fraudulent concealment doctrine, applies to every "malpractice 
action against a health care provider." As noted above, the statute defines 
"malpractice action against a health care provider" to include actions for 
wrongful death "based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising 
out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." Utah Code Anno. §78-14-3(14). Thus, the medical 
malpractice act's two-year statute of limitations applies to cases of 
fraudulent concealment arising out of medical malpractice. 
Id. at 336. 
It would be difficult to find a more general statute of limitation than the four-year 
"catch-all" provision applicable to alienation of affection claims. In Hodges v. Howell, 
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2000 UT App. 171,4 P.3d 803 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), a case upon which plaintiff relies, 
the defendant argued that the one-year statute of limitations governing an action for 
seduction should apply to a claim for alienation of affections rather than the four-year 
catch-all statute. The Court held that seduction is sufficiently different from alienation of 
affections that the statute of limitations for seduction would not apply. Instead, because 
there was no specific statute of limitations for alienation of affections it was governed by 
the four-year catch-all provision. 
By contrast, the Health Care Malpractice Act explicitly provides that "any action 
against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider," 
Utah Code Anno., §78-14-3(14), is governed by the two-year statute of limitations found 
at §78-14-4(1). Using the reasoning from Jensen v. IHC, it is clear that Ms. Dowling's 
claim for alienation of affection as against Kathleen Bullen is barred by the two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitations because it is the more specific statute, the 
legislature intended to have health care providers governed by one statute, and Ms. 
Dowling knew of both the alleged malpractice and the injury flowing therefrom four 
years before she filed her claim. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm Judge Peuler's grant of summary judgment because the 
facts upon which her ruling is based were uncontroverted as to whether Suzanne Dowling 
and James Hoagland were in therapy with Kathleen Bullen when Ms. Bullen allegedly 
27 
began to ''develop feelings" for James. Accordingly, any alienation of affection relates to 
and arises out of the health care that Ms. Bullen rendered or should have rendered, and is 
governed by the two-year statute of limitations found in the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. Ms. Dowling filed her complaint at least two years after that statute of 
limitations expired. 
DATED this 2b "~Day o f ^ W * 2002. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
ifflip S. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Kathleen Bullen 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-2 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-3 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-8 
Rules: 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Other: 
Order Granting Defendant Kathleen Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
And Judgment 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations — Purpose 
of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health 
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the 
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims is 
increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the 
cost of premiiuns to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive 
medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. 
Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to 
provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of 
malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care 
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time estabUshing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes 
unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and 
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to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settle-
ment of claims. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 2. act* in the last paragraph means Laws 1976, 
Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "this Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Medi-
cal Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 287 (1984). 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under 
Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing 
Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
certified social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiro-
practic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
clinical social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided 
in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental 
hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in 
Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physi-
cian, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, 
dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physi-
cian, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician 
and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social 
worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family 
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups 
of persons and oflBcers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. 
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(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under 
Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection Act. 
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a 
licensed practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31-6. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care providei? 
(15) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405. 
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice 
naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as 
a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-302 or 58-44a-305. 
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under 
Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act. 
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice oste-
opathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as 
provided in Section 58-17a-301. 
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical 
therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and 
surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry 
under Title 58, Chapter 5, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act. 
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a 
physician in this state under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice 
Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, 
Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section 
58-61-102. 
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional 
nursing as provided in Section 58-31-9. 
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, 
attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the patient. 
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
social service worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice 
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or 
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3; 1985, ch. 242, § 16; 1996, ch. 232, § 16; 1996, ch. 247, § 47; 
§ 56; 1989, ch. 42, § 14; 1989, ch. 207, § 20; 1996, ch. 248, § 55; 1996, ch. 282, § 26. 
1991, ch. 237, § 17; 1991, ch. 287, § 13; 1992, Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amend-
ch. 240, § 20; 1994, ch. 12, § 118; 1994, ch. ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted 
32, § 52; 1994, ch. 171, § 1; 1994, ch. 187, "chapter" for "act" in the undesignated intro-
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ductory language, inserted Subsection (4) and 
redesignated former Subsections (4) through 
(30) as Subsections (5) through (31), inserted 
"clinical social worker" in Subsection (10), and 
deleted "Part 1" from the citation in Subsection 
(21). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 
2, 1994, substituted "Title 26, Chapter 21, 
Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection 
Act" for "the Hospital Licensing Act" in the 
definition of "hospital." 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 171, effective 
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (8), renumber-
ing the subsequent subsections accordingly. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 32, effective July 
1, 1994, substituted "under Section 58-60-305" 
for "as provided in Section 58-35-5" in Subsec-
tions (2), (4), and (28); deleted "social service 
aide" after "social service worker" in Subsection 
(10); substituted "under Section 58-60-405" for 
"as provided in Section 58-39-6" in Subsection 
(14); inserted "under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psy-
chologist Licensing Act" and substituted "Sec-
tion 58-61-102" for "Subsection 58-25a-2(3)" in 
Subsection (25); deleted former Subsection (28), 
denning "social service aide"; and renumbered 
former Subsections (29) through (31) as Subsec-
tions (28) through (30), respectively. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 187, effective 
July 1, 1994, corrected the references in the 
definition of ^ uirse midwife" and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 232, effective 
July 1, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
"Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act"; 
in Subsections (6) and (7) substituted "58-69-
102" for "58-7-1.1"; in Subsection (11) substi-
tuted "podiatric physician" for "podiatrist"; in 
Subsection (13) substituted "58-31-6" for "58-
ANALYSIS 
Health care provider. 
Cited. 
Health care provider. 
The definition of "health care provider" is 
narrowly construed to include those who hold 
titles explicitly identified in Subsection (11), 
and the phrase "others rendering similar care 
and services" is interpreted to refer to the rare 
situation when a potential defendant's status 
leaves no reasonable doubt as to its necessary 
inclusion among those already listed as "health 
31-10"; in Subsection (19) substituted "Chapter 
68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act" for 
^Chapter 12, Part 1, Utah Osteopathic Medi-
cine Licensing Act"; in Subsection (21) substi-
tuted "58-17a-301" for "58-17-2"; in Subsections 
(23) and (25) substituted "Title 58, Chapter 67" 
for "Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43"; and 
in Subsection (24) substituted ^Podiatric physi-
cian" for "Podiatrist" and "Podiatric Physician 
Licensing Act" for "Podiatrists." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 247, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
'"Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
Practice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
58-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act"; 
in Subsections (6) and (7) substituted "58-69-
102" for "58-7-1.1"; in Subsection (13) substi-
tuted "58-31-6" for "58-31-10"; in Subsection 
(19) substituted "Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic 
Medical Practice Act" for "Chapter 12, Part 1, 
Utah Osteopathic Medicine Licensing Act"; in 
Subsection (21) substituted "58-17a-302" for 
"58-17-2"; in Subsections (23) and (25) substi-
tuted "Title 58, Chapter 67" for "Sections 58-
12-26 through 58-12-43." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
July 1, 1996, changed the references in the 
definitions of "chiropractic physician," "osteo-
pathic physician," "physician" and "practitioner 
of obstetrics." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 282, effective 
July 1, 1996, in Subsection (3) substituted 
'Title 58, Chapter 71, Chiropractic Physician 
I>ractice Act" for "Sections 58-12-50 through 
$8-12-56, the Chiropractic Improvements Act" 
and in Subsection (16) substituted "58-71-102" 
for "58-12-22." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
care providers." Platts v. Parents Helping Par-
ents, 897 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
A company licensed by the Department of 
Human Services as a "day treatment" facility, 
Operating a substance abuse program, and an 
Addiction counselor" employed by the company 
did not come within the definition of "health 
care provider" set forth in Subsection (11). 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P2d 
1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Cited in Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Liability for medical malpractice in medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
connection with performance of circumcision, caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis, 
75 A.L.R.4th 710. care, and representations, 6 A.L.R.5th 534. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other Medical malpractice: who are "health care 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother providers," or the like, whose actions fall within 
or child caused by improper treatment during statutes specifically governing action and dam-
labor, 6 A.L.R.5th 490.
 a g e s f o r medical malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5th 1. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is 
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of tKis act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could 
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128, Cross-References. — Separate trial of stat-
§ 1. ute of limitations issue in malpractice actions, 
"Effective date of this act." — The phrase § 78-12-47. 
"effective date of this act" in Subsection (2) 
means the effective date of Laws 1976, Chapter 
23, which became effective April 1, 1976. 
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78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless 
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances 
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the^ time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be 
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, 
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This 
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
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Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin-
istrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with local 
government pursuant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative 
office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be 
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuant 
to § 78-3-21: Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, 
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997; 
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes, — The 1998 amend- The 2001 amendment deleted "Coalville" and 
ment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" in "Park City" from the list in Subdivision (2). 
Subdivision (2). 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or 
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facte" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte 
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memoran-
dum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and 
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the mction 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the 
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clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 
(1)(D) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum'within five days after service of the responding party's memo-
randum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period 
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs 
(3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or 
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time 
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion 
may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion 
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be 
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and.time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or 
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least 
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time ^the parties file 
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
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(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the 
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or 
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request 
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without, court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment substituted "trial courts of record" for 
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph, 
added Subdivision (3Xh), and made a stylistic 
change. 
The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for 
"issues" in Subdivision (3)(B). 
The April 2001 amendment added the second 
sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylis-
tic changes in the subdivision designations. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
Purpose. 
Request for hearing. 
Supplemental memoranda. 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
While a court may refrain from addressing a 
matter that is not submitted for decision under 
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule 
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua 
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 
P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1999). 
No notice to submit for decision under this 
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly 
determined that it could rule on pending mo-
tions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 
(Utah 1999). 
Purpose. 
The purpose of the code of judicial adminis-
tration is not to create or modify substantive 
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the 
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v. 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, 
denied, 994 R2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Request for hearing. 
Once a request for hearing by one of the 
parties has been granted and the matter set for 
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon 
such setting regardless of whether it made its 
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivi-
sion (2KB), at the end of the first sentence 
substituted the language beginning "contains a 
verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement 
of material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists" and deleted 'and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed" at the end of the second sente nee. 
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1997). 
Supplemental memoranda. 
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (lXa) 
refers to all memoranda received by the court 
— from all parties that either oppose or support 
any motion — and does not mean thai each 
party may submit more than one memoran-
dum; thus, the trial court was well with in its 
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental 
memorandum that was submitted without 
prior invitation and outside the bounds of pro-
cedural rules. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objt ction 
to the plaintiff's first affidavit was framed as a 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respori d, as 
prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Even though the trial court had considered 
both parties' motions and memoranda for and 
against the award of attorney fees, it erred in 
entering its decision before the time allowed 
under this rule to file a reply memorandum had 
expired and in not reconsidering its decision by 
reviewing plaintiffs' reply memorandum and 
revised affidavits. American Vending Servs., 
Inc. vT Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 178 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
A.L.R.3d 1070. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- Failure to give notice of application for de-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d fault judgment where notice is required only by 
1272. custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. Default judgments against the United States 
Opening default or default judgment claimed under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
to have been obtained because of attorney's Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shaft show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
179 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the afiBdavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the afiBdavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References, — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Product liability action. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Breach of fiduciary duty. 
—Contract action. 
Waiver of claims. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Defamation. 
—Duty of care. 
—Employee status. 
—Federal law. 
—Fraud. 
—Judicial immunity. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Lease action. 
—Misrepresentation. 
—Negligence. 
—Proximate cause. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written statement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor 
Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 
1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). — 
r II F.D 
Phillip S Ferguson, #1063 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P C 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
Attorneys for Defendant Bullen 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE DOWLING fka SUZANNE 
HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KATHLEEN BULLEN, TROLLEY 
CORNERS FAMILY THERAPY CLINIC, a 
general partnership, CANYON RIM 
PSYCHOTHERAPY, and John Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
BULLEN'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000907667 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant Kathleen Bullen's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for oral argument on 
October 29, 2001, at 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Sandra Peuler, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administratioa Plaintiff was represented by Kathleen McConkie and Defendant 
Bullen was represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. The Court, having considered the memoranda, 
affidavits, and authorities submitted by the parties, having heard oral argument, and being fully 
advised in the premises, now enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
o i r v n PM 3- u i 
A. The following facts, which were set forth in Defendant Bullen's Supporting 
Memorandum, were not controverted by plaintiff and are undisputed in the record: 
1. Suzanne Dowling was married to James Hoagland and they had two daughters. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, defendant Bullen was a licensed clinical social 
worker. 
3. In December 1994, Ms. Bullen began treating the daughters of plaintiff and her 
then husband, James Hoagland. 
4. From time to time, plaintiff and her then husband sat in on therapy sessions with 
their daughters. 
5. Both plaintiff and her then husband were in individual therapy with Ms. Bullen. 
6. Plaintiff and her then husband were unable to resolve their marital difficulties and 
James Hoagland filed for divorce in January 1996. The divorce became final on or about 
September 26, 1996. 
7. On September 26, 1996, plaintiff learned that Ms. Bullen had engaged in an 
improper relationship with her now ex-husband when her ex-husband and defendant Bullen 
announced that they were dating each other. 
8. Any therapeutic relationship between Ms. Bullen and plaintiff ended in February 
1996. 
9. Ms. Bullen terminated her therapeutic relationship with the children of Suzanne 
Dowling and James Hoagland in the Spring of 1996 (early June for one daughter and mid-April for 
the other). 
10. Defendant Bullen had no further therapy sessions with any member of plaintiff s 
family or with plaintiffs ex-husband after she terminated therapy sessions with plaintiffs daughters. 
All therapeutic contact with plaintiff and plaintiffs family had ended by early June 1996. 
11. Plaintiff did not file her Complaint until September 25, 2000, more than four 
years and 3 months after the acts of negligence of which Plaintiff now complains. 
12. At no time prior to filing her Complaint did plaintiff serve defendant Bullen 
with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action or with a Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review. 
B. Based upon these undisputed facts, Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Bullen are 
related to and arise out of the mental health treatment Ms. Bullen provided to plaintiff and 
plaintiffs family between late 1994 and June 1996. 
C. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Bullen are governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, §§ 78-14-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated, including the statute of limitations set 
forth at § 78-14-4(1). This statute of limitations provides that a plaintiff must file a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Action against a health care provider (which is defined to include licensed 
clinical social workers) "within two years from the date the plaintiff discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,. ..." 
D. It is undisputed in the record that Plaintiff discovered her injury no later than 
September 26, 1996. It is undisputed in the record that plaintiff did not file her lawsuit until 
September 25, 2000. Her complaint is, therefore, barred by the plain language of the statute of 
limitations. 
E. Defendant Bullen's motion is, accordingly, granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is 
dismissed on the merits, with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Judgment be and the 
same hereby is entered in favor of Defendant Bullen and against Plaintiff Dowling, no cause of 
action. Defendant Bullen is awarded her costs incurred herein, 
p DATED this ry Day of November, 2001. 
By the Court: ^ 3 £ ^ 5 * > ^ 
QW^Ugu^j 
Sandra N. Peuler 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
RANDLE, DEAMER, McCONKIE & LEE 
Katmeen McConkie 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Suzanne Dowling 
